Why the lack of a third voice in South Sudan is costing the country heavily
When fighting broke out in Juba,
South Sudan a few weeks ago, all eyes were set on the African Union (AU) summit
that just ended in Kigali, Rwanda and the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) as potential cradles of concrete solutions to deal with the
recurring South Sudan conflict.
Previous and even current attempts
to address the South Sudan question have unfortunately been narrowly defined on
a diametrical ethnic continuum. The problem is a lot more complex than just the
Dinka and the Nuer or SPLA/SPLM in government or in opposition. To
put this in perspective, the Dinka and Nuer are just two out of over sixty
indigenous ethnic groups that make up South Sudan. Demographically, the two
account for less than 50% of the country’s population.
Attempts to sort the South Sudan
question have been blind to the broader complexities of the young
country. The solution equation has conveniently left out over 50% of the
country’s settlers; this is on top of excluding other power centers including
civil society, traditional institutions etc.
The recent transitional government
of national unity (TGoNU) formed in April 2016 to administer the country for
the next two and a half years, pending elections, followed the same flawed
conceptual formula of owlishly interpreting the South Sudan conflict along two
ethnic lines - the Dinka and Nuer.
Secondly, transitional politics also
created a merger between SPLM/SPLA in government and in opposition. This only
meant that there was not going to be any significant political alternative
voice. This was further enflamed by the reluctance of the Troika members
(United States, United Kingdom, and Norway) to invest in civil society
institutions – as alternative voices. In fact, the Troika is viewed to
have invested heavily in the South Sudan government at the expense of civil
society. Due to this intended or unintended oversight, it is now very
difficult to mobilise civil society groups to offer alternative thinking
because they are either thin or not present at all on the ground. The
weak nature of civil society in South Sudan has made it susceptible to
political threats and clampdowns.
In brief, you now have a situation
where there is neither opposition nor civil society to check government in
South Sudan.
The military is another power center
in South Sudan. However, under the current context, you have ‘those who
fought’ talking to themselves in the on-going negotiations.
Analysts contend that SPLM/SPLA in
government and in opposition represent a small minority of South
Sudanese. What makes these two factions stand out is simply because they
both maintain exclusive possession of guns. Actually a very common adage in
South Sudan is that you can only be called to the negotiating table only if you
have been deemed to possess a significant number of guns or weapons. This
clearly points to the exclusion of a majority of South Sudanese who neither
possess weapons nor belong to the two warring parties.
Because of the conspicuous silence
of the majority of the people in South Sudan, there is definitely a need for a
third voice. A voice that is not necessarily anchored in military or
militarism; a voice that is not linked to any of the current two protagonists
(SPLA and SPLA-IO); but a voice that will be open to discussing the South Sudan
question through the broader, inclusive national lenses.
The IGAD led peace processes suffer
from the deficit of representation. It is mainly, the SPLA/SPLM that is on the
table. The constituency affected by the ongoing conflict is wider than the
SPLA/SPLM (in government and in opposition). Therefore, a peace process that
excludes majority of South Sudanese cannot be expected to yield sustainable
peace.
To ensure an inclusive and
comprehensive peace process, every South Sudanese, directly or through elected
representatives, who is willing and able to take part in the talks should be
able to do so without hindrance.
The solution to the conflict has to
integrate strong elements of indigenous political will anchored in the buy-in
of all or a majority of the South Sudanese.
Military interventions will continue having far-reaching effects on
South Sudan itself and the region at large – and may not deliver the lasting
peace that the South Sudanese are questing for.
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